Talk:Emotivism

Psychology Mid‑importance

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Philosophy: Ethics / Analytic / Contemporary Mid‑importance

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Attributing objections

First of all, these objections need to be attributed. Second of all, they don't seem to be correct. A steals from B. I have a negative reaction to A stealing from B. I criticize A stealing from B.

Emotivists suffer from the several key flaws in this line of thought, a couple being:

They could never legitimitely criticize the moral views of other people's actions.
They could never legitimitely criticize the moral views of their own actions.

If a person does something an emotivist doesn't like, he/she cannot criticize that person because, for that person, it may be morally correct.

This doesn't follow at all. A steals from B. A doesn't feel bad about stealing from B, but I feel bad about A stealing from B so I criticize A based on my feelings.

Likewise, they could not criticize themselves, either for past or present actions, because at the time, it would have been morally correct.

Again, doesn't follow. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Roadrunner (talk • contribs) 17:14, July 18, 2003 (UTC)

Elaboration

This page needs SIGNIFICANT elaboration, as this is a fairly important movement in 20th century ethics, from the viewpoint of both meta-ethical theory as well as modern analytic philosophy. It's connection to the school of Logical Postivism and the Vienna circle, as well as it's influence should be discussed in length. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 68.35.245.121 (talk) 18:35, March 20, 2007 (UTC)

Excellent work

Hi everyone. I've been working on cleaning up meta-ethics articles lately, getting them all to agree with each other and match in formatting and presentation, and I have to say that this is the best-written one I've come across so far. Clear and precise, cohesive, with references and even illustrations. Congratulations to the editors here. We could use people like you on some of the other meta-ethics articles. -Pfhorrest (talk) 07:03, 3 October 2008 (UTC)[reply]

Title

Is it worth recording that RM Hare did not like the term "emotions" applied to moral, or indeed aesthetic, judgments? He said you could be emotional or calm and emotionless when delivering such a judgment, like "eating people is wrong". The judgments themselves were not emotions. This surely is true, but I am afraid the horse has bolted. It is also OR, being based on personal memory, and so can't go into the article. Seadowns (talk) 11:31, 2 May 2018 (UTC)[reply]

Quasi-realism & Emotivism

Both Emotivism and Quasi-realism state that these two meta-ethical positions are in opposition, but they do not give an explanation. Can someone help? Lboukoko (talk) 05:20, 15 February 2020 (UTC)[reply]