Jump to content

Talk:Rogers Commission Report

Page contents not supported in other languages.
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Edit request - Conclusion

[edit]

The statement at the end of the article that...

Reforms to NASA procedures were enacted which attempted to preclude another occurrence of such an accident, and the Shuttle program would continue without serious incident until the Space Shuttle Columbia disaster on February 1, 2003.

...is technically true but grossly misleading. In fact, although reforms were attempted, they demonstrably failed. The Columbia Accident Investigation board traces the destruction of Columbia to the same institutional factors that lead to the loss of Challenger. The foam strike that destroyed Columbia was a serious problem which went back to the first shuttle launch and any type of tile damage was specifically detailed as unacceptable in the shuttle design. Despite this, every shuttle mission experienced foam strikes of various (sometimes serious) sizes, and these were institutionally "normalized" in exactly the same way the O-ring burn-throughs were normalized. Columbia crashed on it's 28th flight, and made for 2 shuttles lost catastrophically on 114 launches. These statistics closely match the 1/50 - 1/100 chance of disaster that Richard Feynman found on polling NASA engineers, and the 1/50 chance calculated by the USAF when they found the shuttle too risky to use as a launch vehicle for military satellites. NASA internal documents show serious organizational problems similar to those found by the Rogers commission still persisting throughout the 1990s. I lack the time right now to dig out the references, but they're a worthwhile project for any keen Wikipedian. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 99.234.246.223 (talk) 18:58, 10 January 2011 (UTC)[reply]

I have attempted to do so by borrowing the sourced information from the extant Wikipedia article on the Challenger disaster, which raised the points you mention in regards to the inefficacy of attempted reforms.74.83.14.59 (talk) 10:39, 28 April 2012 (UTC)[reply]

Image

[edit]

Consider using this image of debris in hangar waiting to be identified http://images.jsc.nasa.gov/iams/images/pao/STS51L/10062423.htm Ke4roh 13:42, 17 Dec 2003 (UTC)

John Glenn needs to be listed as well. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 166.56.102.219 (talk) 18:38, 2 November 2010 (UTC)[reply]

Balanced?

[edit]

This article is more about feynman than about the commission report.62.12.14.25 (talk) 11:31, 3 April 2013 (UTC)[reply]

9 years later, but yeah. I'm a massive Feynman fan, but this is ridiculously undue weight on Feynman. The focus is the committee and the Challenger disaster report, not the celebrity genius who has a way with words, and who was only one of many members of the committee. Dcs002 (talk) 05:02, 30 July 2022 (UTC)[reply]

Where "The Nine Recommendations"?

[edit]

The article says "The Rogers Commission offered nine recommendations on improving safety in the space shuttle program"... Many other sites and documents use this phrase, or a variation like "The Rogers Commission offered NASA nine recommendations that were to be implemented before shuttle flights resumed". But, neither the article nor the other sites, express in a summary these nine recommendations, that is an importantencyclopedic information.

Here a summary of the chapter of Recommendations:

  1. Design and Independent Oversight
  2. Shuttle Management Structure, Astronauts in Management and Shuttle Safety Panel
  3. Criticality Review and Hazard Analysis
  4. Safety Organization
  5. Improved Communications
  6. Landing Safety
  7. Launch Abort and Crew Escape
  8. Flight Rate
  9. Maintenance Safeguards

The same (1986's) summary, with the summary of later 2000 NASA's response (as spaceline.org/challenger and hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History, using the abbreviation NR for "NASA's response"):

  1. Design and Independent Oversight
    NR: The Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Boosters (SRB) were extensively redesigned.
  2. A. Shuttle Management Structure, B. Astronauts in Management and C. Shuttle Safety Panel
    NR.A: The Administrator has appointed (...) to study every aspect of how NASA manages its programs, including relationships between various field centers and NASA Headquarters. (...) this group will address the roles and responsibilities of the Space Shuttle Program Manager to assure that the position has the authority commensurate with its responsibilities.
    NR.B: Rear Admiral Richard Truly, a former astronaut, has been appointed as Associate Administrator for the Office of Space Flight. Several active astronauts are currently serving in management positions in the agency.
    NR.C: A Shuttle Safety Panel will be established by the Associate Administrator for Space Flight not later than September 1, 1986, with direct access to the Space Shuttle Program Manager.
  3. A. Criticality Review and B. Hazard Analysis
    NR.A: Numerous hardware, software and safety improvements were incorporated into the Space Shuttle. (...) The team has evaluated several design alternatives, and analysis and testing are in progress to determine the preferred approaches which minimize hardware redesign.
    NR.B: (...) the National Research Council (NRC) has established an Independent Oversight Group.
  4. Safety Organization
    NR: New and strict risk identification and reduction programs were applied to all Space Shuttle operations.
  5. Improved Communications
    NR: The Space Shuttle program was reorganized and decentralized to make sure all pertinent information was made available to management personnel at all levels.
  6. Landing Safety
    NR: Documentation from all previous Space Shuttle missions was reviewed, and all documented waivers to existing flight safety criteria were revoked and forbidden.
  7. Launch Abort and Crew Escape
    NR: Any technical issues arising during preparation for a particular Space Shuttle mission were opened up to review by independent government agencies (...).
  8. Flight Rate
    NR: A series of open reviews were enacted to discuss all significant and outstanding issues prior to a particular Space Shuttle mission.
  9. Maintenance Safeguards
    NR: A mechanism was put into place that would allow NASA and contractor personnel to provide open and anonymous reporting of Space Shuttle safety concerns without fear of reprisal.

--Krauss (talk) 12:44, 21 February 2015 (UTC)[reply]

[edit]

Hello fellow Wikipedians,

I have just modified 2 external links on Rogers Commission Report. Please take a moment to review my edit. If you have any questions, or need the bot to ignore the links, or the page altogether, please visit this simple FaQ for additional information. I made the following changes:

When you have finished reviewing my changes, you may follow the instructions on the template below to fix any issues with the URLs.

This message was posted before February 2018. After February 2018, "External links modified" talk page sections are no longer generated or monitored by InternetArchiveBot. No special action is required regarding these talk page notices, other than regular verification using the archive tool instructions below. Editors have permission to delete these "External links modified" talk page sections if they want to de-clutter talk pages, but see the RfC before doing mass systematic removals. This message is updated dynamically through the template {{source check}} (last update: 5 June 2024).

  • If you have discovered URLs which were erroneously considered dead by the bot, you can report them with this tool.
  • If you found an error with any archives or the URLs themselves, you can fix them with this tool.

Cheers.—InternetArchiveBot (Report bug) 23:15, 10 December 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Rogers_Commission_Report&oldid=1196835219"